CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—EQUAL PROTECTION—FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION—MASSACHUSETTS STATUTE DENYING BENEFITS TO THOSE DISCHARGED AS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL—Reynolds v. Dukakis, 441 F. Supp. 646 (D. Mass.1977) by Schultz, David B.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 1 1 (1978-1979)









Dukakis, 441 F. Supp. 646 (D. Mass.1977)
David B. Schultz
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
David B. Schultz, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—EQUAL PROTECTION—FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION—MASSACHUSETTS
STATUTE DENYING BENEFITS TO THOSE DISCHARGED AS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL—Reynolds v. Dukakis, 441 F. Supp. 646 (D. Mass.1977), 1 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 393 (1978),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol1/iss2/6
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-FREE EXERCISE 
OF RELIGION-MASSACHUSETTS STATUTE DENYING BENEFITS 
TO THOSE DISCHARGED AS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS HELD 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL-Reynolds v. Dukakis, 441 F. Supp. 646 (D. 
Mass. 1977) 
David Reynolds received a bachelor's degree from the Univer­
sity of Massachusetts shortly before he enlisted in the United 
States Coast Guard on December 18, 1968. Early in the summer of 
1969, Reynolds was commissioned as an ensign and agreed to a five­
year military commitment. He served as a helicopter pilot until 
September 9, 1972 when, after three years and nine months of 
military service, Reynolds applied for a discharge as a conscientious 
objector. 1 
Between September 1972 and June 1973, Reynolds was as­
signed noncombatant duties. These duties, as well as all duties per­
formed before September of 1972, were carried out satisfactorily. 
In June, 1973, after fulfilling four and a half years of his five-year 
military obligation, Reynolds received an honorable discharge from 
the United States Coast Guard. The discharge contained a notation 
that conscientious objection was the reason for severance from the 
service. 2 
In the fall of 1973, Reynolds was accepted into a graduate pro­
gram at the University of Massachusetts. He applied for veterans' 
educational benefits from the federal government and from the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Reynolds, however, received only 
federal veterans' benefits. 3 Under Massachusetts law,4 Reynolds 
did not qualify as a veteran because he had been discharged as a 
conscientious objector and, therefore, was not eligible to receive 
educational benefits. 5 
l. Reynolds v. Dukakis, 441 F. Supp. 646, 648 (D. Mass. 1977). 
2. Id. at 648-49. 
3. Id. at 649. 
4. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 4, § 7(43) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1973) defines a "vete­
ran" as "any person, ... (a) whose last discharge or release from his wartime service, 
as defined herein, was under honorable conditions . . .." The statute further pro­
vides that "[nlone of the following shall be deemed to be a "veteran": ... (c) Any 
person who was designated as a conscientious objector upon his last discharge or 
release from the armed forces of the United States." 
5. Reynolds was informed of his ineligibility for veterans' benefits by Robert E. 
Feeney, Military Archivist for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in a letter dated 
September 26, 1973. After informing Reynolds that he was ineligible for benefits, 
Feeney stated that the Department of Education would make the ultimate decision 
of whether a tuition exemption certificate would be issued to Reynolds. For an un­
393 
394 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vo!. 1:393 
Because he was unable to meet his tuition payments as they 
became due, Reynolds withdrew from the University of Massachu­
setts. At the time of withdrawal Reynolds owed the university 
more than $300. He then worked as a sawmill operator until Au­
gust 1976, when hurricane winds toppled a tree onto the truck in 
which he was riding, fracturing his skull and shattering a vertebra 
in his back. Reynolds, probably relying on the Massachusetts defi­
nition of veteran, did not apply for state medical and hospitalization 
benefits available to veterans. 6 
Claiming that the Massachusetts statute violated the first, fifth, 
and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, 
Reynolds filed a class action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts. He named Michael Dukakis,7 Vahan 
Vartanian,8 Robert Feeney,9 and Leroy Keith10 as defendants and 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The defendants filed a mo­
tion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction. ll After oral argument on the motion, 
the district court ordered the parties to file briefs on the question 
of whether the Massachusetts statute violated the plaintiff's equal 
protection rights. 12 After the briefs were filed, and without further 
oral argument, the three-judge district court13 held that the Massa­
known reason, the Department of Education never made that decision. Brief for 
Plaintiff at 2, Reynolds v. Dukakis, 441 F. Supp. 646 (D. Mass. 1977). 
6. The plaintiff's complaint was never "amended to allege that his failure to 
apply for medical benefits as a veteran was based on the prior ruling that he could 
not qualify [as a veteran]." 441 F. Supp. at 649. See Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 5, 
at 3. 
7. Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
8. Adjutant General and Commissioner of War Records of the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts. 
9. See note 5 supra. 
10. Chancellor of the Board of Higher Education. 
11. The Court disposed of this claim by ruling that subject matter jurisdiction 
existed "on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1331-federal question jurisdiction-and also on 
the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1343-this case being a civil rights action alleged to arise 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." 441 F. Supp. at 649. The defendants also unsuccessfully 
argued that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
The defendants were successful, however, in their attempt to show that a class action 
was unwarranted because the plaintiff failed to "establish the existence in fact of a 
class 'so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical' ...." Id. at 650. 
Therefore, the plaintiff failed to meet the class action requirements of FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(a)(I). Only nine persons could be considered potential class members. 
12. Reynolds v. Dukakis, No. 75-5109-J (D. Mass., July 29, 1976). 
13. The plaintiff applied for a three-judge court on the basis of 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2283-2284. Because the plaintiff sought an injunction against the operation of an al­
legedly unconstitutional statute, the case was properly before the court. The court's 
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chusetts statute was unconstitutional. The court found that a state 
statute which denies veterans' benefits to an individual honorably 
discharged as a conscientious objector was in conflict with the fed­
eral scheme that awards benefits to honorably discharged conscien­
tious objectors. 14 
The Reynolds court reached a justifiable result. A strong ar­
gument exists, however, that state legislation which bars veterans' 
benefits to those discharged as conscientious objectors conflicts 
with neither the federal policy underlying the discharge of con­
scientious objectors nor the federal benefits to which conscientious 
objectors are entitled. 15 Rather than relying on a strained conflict 
with federal law, the court should have decided Reynolds on the 
basis of equal protection and first amendment standards. The court 
recognized 
a serious equal protection problem in a statute, ... which with­
holds veterans' benefits from a person who exercises what the 
federal authorities have, at least by implication, found to be a 
jurisdiction was maintained because the defendant made no valid allegations as to 
the plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. 441 F. Supp. at 648-50. 
14. ld. at 653-54. "When a state legislature undertakes to enact legislation, 
the effect of which would be to frustrate the congressional intention and to produce 
results diametrically opposed to those sought by the federal law, the state legisla­
tion must give way." ld. at 653. A state statute which denies veteran status to an 
in-service conscientious objector, thereby barring his eligibility for veterans' ben­
efits, "is clearly at cross purposes with the federal statutory scheme which now 
places no sanctions on [an in-service conscientious objectorl." ld. 
15. ld. at 655 (Julian, J., dissenting). The court found a conflict between the 
federal and state statutes arising out of the state's denial of veteran status granted 
Reynolds by Congress. The dissent saw no conflict because "[n]either the dis­
charge of conscientious objectors . . . nor the granting to them of federal veterans' 
benefits is in any way frustrated or impeded by enforcement of [the Massachusetts 
statute]. There is no obligation on Massachusetts to supplement the benefits con­
ferred by federal law on 1-0 conscientious objectors." ld. at 655 (citations omitted). 
The federal benefits granted to veterans and the underlying policies of each are 
codified in 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-1007 (1970 & Supp. III 1978). Generally, courts favor 
decisions based on narrow grounds. If, for example, a state statute clearly violated 
the fourteenth amendment, but addressed an area of law clearly pre-empted by 
federal law, most courts would base their decision on the narrower pre-emption 
grounds rather than the broader constitutional grounds. See Note, Pre-emption as 
a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959). 
Assuming, in Reynolds, that a legitimate conflict exists beween the state and fed­
eral statutes, the conflict would appear to be the logical basis for decision. Where, 
however, only a strained conflict exists, most courts would then dispose of a case 
on constitutional grounds. In Reynolds, the plaintiff was eligible for, and did re­
ceive, federal benefits. The Massachusetts statute infringed on neither the policy 
nor the operation of federal law. Therefore, since here there is only a questionable 
conflict, the court should have based its decision on equal protection grounds. 
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free exercise right, while that same statute does not withhold 
those same veterans' benefits from persons found by the military 
service to be, [unsuitable for the service).16 
The district court filed three opinions. Chief Judge Caffrey, 
writing for the majority, found that a conflict existed between state 
and federal law. Judge Aldrich, concurring, felt that the equal pro­
tection argument deserved further consideration. Finally, Judge Ju­
lian, in dissent, found neither that a conflict existed between state 
and federal law nor that an equal protection argument was jus­
tified. 
1. BACKGROUND 
Conscientious objection to war is not a new concept in 
America. Exemptions from military service for those who were 
conscientiously opposed to war first appeared in colonial statutes 
more than 100 years before the American Revolution. 17 "However, 
the high cost of supporting a fighting militia and the general feeling 
that those of nonresistant faith were 'getting off too easily' caused 
most colonies to require the exempted person to either provide a 
substitute to fight in their stead or to pay a commutation fee. "18 This 
policy continued in various forms19 until 1917 when personal mili­
tary service became obligatory. 
The Draft Act of 191720 exempted only those who could show 
they belonged to well-recognized religious organizations whose 
creed prohibited any mode of combatant participation. The lan­
guage of this statute had the effect of denying military service ex­
emptions to those having deeply rooted religious beliefs in oppo­
sition to war simply because the religious organization of which they 
were a member was not "well-recognized." 
The "well-recognized" clause was finally omitted in 1940. It 
was replaced by the requirement that one show that his opposition 
to war was grounded in his religious training and belief.21 In order 
16. Id. at 654. 
17. Conscientious objectors were probably first exempted in 1673 by the colo­
nial legislature in Rhode Island. See Russell, Development of Conscientious Objec­
tor Recognition in the United States, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409 (1952). 
18. Id. at 414 (footnote omitted). 
19. See Mass. Act of Oct. 19, 1664 (commutation fee), Mass. Act ofJan. 22, 1776 
(exempting Quakers), Draft Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 731 (substitutions and commutation 
fees), cited in Russell, supra note 17 (citing SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, CON­
SCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 40-41 (Special Monograph 11, 1950». 
20. Ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 (1917). 
21. Selective Training and Service Act, ch. 720,54 Stat. 885 (1940). 
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to be granted an exemption from military service as a conscientious 
objector, an individual was required to show that his religious 
training and belief centered around a "Supreme Being. "22 
The "Supreme Being" standard soon proved to be inequitable 
for those who were sincerely opposed to war but could not ground 
their opposition upon a belief in a "God." In 1965, in United States 
v. Seeger, 23 the Supreme Court developed a new test to determine 
whether to exempt an applicant from military service on the basis 
of conscientious objection. Although Seeger's religious beliefs were 
sincere, he was convicted of refusing induction into the armed 
forces because his belief was not grounded on a "Supreme Being." 
Instead, Seeger believed in "goodness and virtue for their own 
sakes and [had] a religious faith in a purely ethical creed. "24 After 
recognizing the broad scope of the term "religion," the Court 
enunciated the new standard for conscientious objector exemptions: 
"[D]oes the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the 
objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly 
qualified for exemption?"25 In order to gain an exemption based on 
conscientious objection, therefore, one must object to war in any 
form and show that his objection stems from religious training and 
belief. 26 
Once an individual is classified as a conscientious objector he 
is then subclassified as either opposed to any form of participation 
in any war or opposed only to service in combat. The members of 
the former group are classified as 1_027 while those in the latter 
22. Id. 
23. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
24. Id. at 166. 
25. Id. at 184. The Seeger decision, however, provided very little insight re­
garding the definitional limits of "religious training and belief." Congress defined 
religious training and belief as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme 
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not 
including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely per­
sonal moral code." Id. at 172 (citing Selective Training and Service Act, ch. 720, 54 
Stat. 885 (1940), as amended by Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 604 (1948)). This 
amendment was the result of the decision in Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 
(9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946), which held that philosophical, so­
cial, or political beliefs were not included in the definition of religious training and 
belief. Five years after Seeger, however, the Supreme Court indicated that philos­
ophical, social, and political beliefs may fit within the definition of religious training 
and belief. Welsh v. United States, 298 U.S. 333 (1970). In Welsh, the plaintiff did 
not view his beliefs as being of a religious nature. The Court, however, noted the 
sincerity of his convictions and held that Welsh's beliefs were within the broad 
scope of the term "religious" as stated by the Seeger Court. Id. at 343. 
26. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 456(j) (1970). 
27. National Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.14(a) (1977). 
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group are classified as l-A-O.28 
Those classified as l-A-O actively serve in the military in a 
noncombatant function. 29 If their service has been satisfactory, they 
receive an honorable discharge and are entitled to all federal bene­
fits available to veterans. Those classified as 1-0 are assigned to 
alternate civilian service. 3o When the 1-0 has completed his tour of 
duty, however, he is not entitled to veterans' benefits because he 
has not actively served in the military and, therefore, cannot be 
classified as a veteran. 31 
In 1962, provisions were made to cover the situation where an 
individual claims to be a conscientious objector after his induction 
into the service. 32 One may apply for a conscientious objection 
exemption after induction only if the belief upon which the applica­
tion is grounded arose after induction. 33 
If the in-service conscientious objector is granted a l-A-O 
classification, he will be transferred to noncombatant duty or dis­
charged. 34 There is nothing on the l-A-O discharge to indicate that 
conscientious objection is the reason for severance from the ser­
vice. 35 The discharged l-A-O is eligible for all federal and state vet­
erans' benefits unless, for other reasons, he received an other­
than-honorable discharge. 
If the in-service conscientious objector is granted a 1-0 classi­
fication, he is usually discharged. 36 Unlike the in-service l-A-O, 
however, a notation is made on the in-service 1-0's discharge that 
the severance is the result of conscientious objection. 37 The nota­
tion of conscientious objection is made solely for the purpose of 
avoiding later confusion. 38 The notation in no way affects one's right 
to receive federal veterans' benefits. Massachusetts, however, used 
28. Id. § 1622.11. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. § 1622.14(a). 
31. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). 
32. Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 (Aug. 21, 1962). See generally Com­
ment, God, the Army, and Judicial Review: The In-Service Conscientious Objector, 
56 CALIF. L. REV. 379 (1968). 
33. Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6, § IV(B)(2) (May 10, 1968). See 
Grubb v. Birdsong, 452 F.2d 516 (6th CiT. 1971). 
34. National Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 75.7(b) (1977). 
35. Id. 
36. The discharge is granted for the convenience of the government. Dep't of 
Defense Directive No. 1300.6, § VI(C)(l) (May 10, 1968). 
37. National Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 75.7(a) (1977). 
38. Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6, § VI(C)(l)(a) (May 10, 1968). 
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this notation as the basis for denial of veterans' benefits to any ap­
plicant who fit within the class. 39 
II. FEDERAL VETERANS' BENEFITS 
Congress passed veterans' benefits legislation as part of its 
function to make all laws necessary and proper to raise and support 
armies. 4o These benefits were intended as compensation to those 
whose lives were significantly disrupted by military service. 41 The 
benefits were also intended to aid veterans in re-adjusting to civi­
lian life. 42 
Originally, benefits flowed only to those veterans who received 
injuries in the service. After World War II, however, legislation 
was passed which recognized all veterans as eligible to receive 
benefits. Since World War II, the nature of the benefits offered has 
changed but the basic premise-that all veterans· are eligible for 
benefits43-has not changed. 
Under federal law, "[t]he term 'veteran' means a person who 
served in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was 
discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dis­
honorable. "44 Whether one is entitled to collect federal veterans' 
benefits upon severance from the service depends on the type of 
discharge he received. 45 Regulations, established by the Depart­
ment of Defense and made applicable to all military branches, gave 
certain superior officers discretion to grant different types of dis­
charges based on a serviceman's record. 46 Since conscientious ob­
jection is not grounds for a dishonorable discharge, anyone granted 
a l-A-O or 1-0 classification after induction is eligible for federal 
veterans' benefits unless he fails to meet some other element in­
cluded within the federal definition of a "veteran." The notation 
that the reason for severance was conscientious objection receives 
no consideration in the determination of eligibility for federal bene­
fits. 
39. See ~iass. GEN. LAws ch. 4, § 7(43) (Michie/Law Co-op 1973). 
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
41. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). 
42. Id. 
43. National Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(a) (1977) "[r]econgize[s] the claims of 
bona fide conscientious objectors in the military service...." 
44. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1970). 
45. National Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 75.7 (1977). 
46. Id. § 41. 
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III. VETERANS' BENEFITS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
The Massachusetts definition of "veteran" differs markedly 
from the federal definition. In pertinent part, the Massachusetts 
legislature has defined the term "veteran" to exclude "[a]ny person 
who was designated as a conscientious objector upon his last dis­
charge or release from the armed forces of the United States."47 
There is no legislative history available to describe the purpose 
of the Massachusetts statute. The 1954 statute was probably passed 
in accordance with the then prevalent federal policy aimed at 
punishing those in the service who refused to obey orders or wear 
a military uniform. 48 Those exhibiting this type of behavior were 
dishonorably discharged without regard to the consideration that 
conscience may have been the motivating factor behind the be­
havior. By 1962, however, the federal attitude toward conscientious 
objectors was more in line with current policy: It is more important 
to recognize a person's religious rights than it is to force him to 
serve in the military.49 In 1962, the Department of Defense first 
implemented a policy for the discharge of those who validly 
claimed to be conscientiously opposed to war of any kind. 50 If the 
individual's service record was satisfactory a discharge under hon­
orable conditions was granted, and the serviceman was entitled to 
full federal veterans' benefits. If the individual's service record was 
marred by his refusal to wear the uniform or to obey orders and 
carry out his assigned duties, the serviceman received a discharge 
47. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 4, § 7(43) (Michie/Law Co-op 1973). 
48. 441 F. Supp. at 652. This was a major thrust of plaintiff's argument. Con­
scientious objectors were first excluded from receiving federal benefits by the 1918 
amendments to the Federal War Risk Insurance Act, ch. lO4, 40 Stat. 609, 609-lO 
(1918), where they were classified with deserters and enemy aliens. A 1918 amend­
ment to the Espionage Act of 1917 imposed fines and prison sentences on those who 
refused induction. The punitive nature of these acts demonstrates the strong public 
sentiment against conscientious objectors. In 1919, Massachusetts passed a statute 
granting employment preference to veterans. Conscientious objectors were excluded 
by this act. 1919 Mass. Acts ch. 150, § 1. The language of this statute was substan­
tially similar to that of the Federal War Risk Insurance Act, ch. 104, 40 Stat. 609, 
609-lO (1918). The language of the statute at issue in Reynolds, MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 4, § 7(43), is substantially similar to the 1919 Massachusetts Employment Prefer­
ence Act. Since the 1919 Act was aimed at reaching the conscientious objectors who 
failed to take orders, refused to wear the uniform, and exhibited general disruptive 
behavior, it is not unreasonable to conclude that MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 4, § 7(43) was 
punitively designed with the same objectives in mind. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 
5, at 20-34. 
49. See 38 U.S.C. § 3lO3 (1959); 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1967). See also Gillette 
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
50. Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 (Aug. 21, 1962). 
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under other-than-honorable conditions and was not eligible for fed­
eral veterans' benefits. 51 This policy is still in effect. 52 
The Massachusetts provision excluding conscientious objectors 
from veteran status has not been amended since its passage in 
1954. It contains substantially the same language as a 1919 statute 
which was designed as a punitive measure against those conscien­
tiously opposed to war. 53 The continuation of the same language im­
plies that the statute at issue was also designed as a punitive meas­
ure against conscientious objectors. 
IV. . EQUAL PROTECTION 
The fourteenth amendment guarantees that "[n]o state shall 
. deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws. "54 
The Constitution does not, however, guarantee absolute equality to 
every person. The fourteenth amendment prevents unequal treat­
ment of people who are similarly situated by forbidding state ac­
tion which results in arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination. 
A statute, by its very nature,· must classify people into differ­
ent groups for different purposes. The fourteenth amendment does 
not deny a state the right to make statutory classifications. To the 
contrary, a statute's strength depends upon an effective classifica­
tion scheme. When a state makes classifications based upon recog­
nized differences between people, there must be a reasonable basis 
for the classification. In addition, the distinguishing feature upon 
which the classification has been made must have a reasonable rela­
tion to the legislative purpose. 55 
5l. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 23-29. See note 44 supra and accompany­
ing text. A veteran is one who receives a discharge under other-than-dishonorable 
conditions. This is a condition precedent to the right to receive either state or federal 
veterans' benefits. Certainly, one who receives an honorable discharge is eligible for 
veterans' benefits. As discussed in the text accompanying note 61 infra, one who 
receives a general discharge for unsuitability to the service may also be eligible for 
Massachusetts veterans' benefits as well as federal veterans' benefits. 
52. Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 (May 10, 1968). 
53. See note 48 supra. 
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l. 
55. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). If a state enactment 
classifies all persons who have received a law degree into a group, it may be said 
that there is a reasonable basis for identifying the common group characteristic. If 
the state enactment goes further to say that this class is the only class entitled to 
practice law in the state, it may be said that there is a reasonable relation between 
the classification made and the statutory purpose. On the other hand, if the state 
enactment says that only those persons who have received law degrees are entitled 
to practice medicine in the state, the enactment has exceeded the bounds of reason. 
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Each statutory classification includes some groups and excludes 
others. Some classifications may operate to exclude individuals who 
are similarly situated to those who are included by the classifica­
tion. The legislature must have a reasonable basis for each 
classification. 56 When there is no reasonable basis for differentiat­
ing between groups, that is, no rational relation between the chal­
lenged classification and the purpose of the statute, the state has 
violated the equal protection clause. 
In Reynolds, the statute barring veteran status to conscientious 
objectors classifies servicemen into two groups. Both groups re­
ceived discharges under other-than-dishonorable conditions. The 
first group is composed of those who honorably completed their 
term of service. and those who were discharged before completing 
their term o( service because they were unsuitable for the service. 
Also included in this first group are those who were discharged as 
l-A-O conscientious objectors because they were opposed only to 
participation in combat. All members of this group are classified as 
veterans and are eligible to receive veterans' benefits in Massachu­
setts. The second group is made up of those discharged honorably 
with a notation of conscientious objector because of their opposition 
to participation in war in any form and, therefore, classified as 1-0. 
The members of this group are not classified as veterans and, 
therefore, are not entitled to receive state veterans' benefits. 
The plaintiff argued that the classifications made by the statute 
are, at the same time, both overinclusive and underinclusive. 57 
The classification is overinclusive because it denies benefits to all 
conscientious objectors classified as 1-0 regardless of the length of 
their active service. 58 Most 1-0 conscientious objectors are never 
inducted into the service. Instead, they perform alternate civilian 
service. Therefore, they never actively serve in the military and 
are not entitled to benefits because they are not veterans. 59 The 
plaintiff was not similarly situated to this group of 1-0 conscientious 
objector. Reynolds performed four and a half years of active mili-
There is no rational relationship between the classification scheme and the purpose 
of the statute. 
56. See id. For instance, if a legislative act states that only those lawyers over 
six feet may practice law in the state, the state has arbitrarily and unreasonably dis­
criminated among two similarly situated groups. Lawyers over six feet tall are bene­
fited by this statute. Lawyers under six feet tall, however, are unreasonably burdened. 
57. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 4-11. 
58. ld. 
59. See Johnson v. Robis0n, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Zweig, Military Law, 1976 
ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 687, 699-700. 
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tary service. By including Reynolds in the same group as all I-Os, 
the statute includes more people than necessary to accomplish its 
purpose of providing benefits to veterans. 
The classification is underinclusive because, on the one hand, 
it grants benefits to l-A-O conscientious objectors who have actively 
served in the military and, on the other hand, denies benefits to 
1-0 conscientious objectors who have actively served in the mili­
tary.60 By excluding Reynolds from the class of conscientious objec­
tors who have actively served in the military, the statutory purpose 
is not accomplished because more people than necessary have been 
excluded. The classification also grants benefits to those discharged 
because of their unsuitability to the service. Persons severed from 
the service in this manner include homosexuals, abusers of alcohol, 
those who exhibit unsanitary habits and personality disorders as 
well as those who are apathetic, have defective attitudes or are 
unable to expend their effort constructively.61 If these individuals 
have otherwise satisfactory service records, they receive a discharge 
under other-than-dishonorable conditions and are entitled to re­
ceive both federal and state veterans' benefits. Thus the statutory 
classification is again underinclusive because, by excluding Rey­
nolds from the class composed of unsuitables, it includes fewer 
persons than necessary to accomplish its purpose. 62 
60. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 4-11. The dissent adopted the view that 
Reynolds was not similarly situated with I-A-O conscientious objectors and those dis­
charged for unsuitability to the service. The view is grounded on the voluntary na­
ture of the plaintiff's initiation of his discharge. Irrespective of their personal prefer­
ences, the government initiates the discharge of I-A-O conscientious objectors and 
those found to be unsuitable. 441 F. Supp. at 656. Judge Aldrich, in his concurring 
opinion, effectively met this argument by observing that the conduct of a conscien­
tious objector--expressing his convictions and initiating his own discharge-is no 
more voluntary than the conduct of one which leads to a discharge for unsuitability. 
This argument is strengthened by the fact that those experiencing the requisite de­
gree of hardship may initiate their own discharge without incurring either state or 
federal sanction. [d. at 654-55. Thus, the dissent's finding that 1-0 conscientious ob­
jectors are not similarly situated with I-A-O conscientious objectors and those found 
to be unsuitable because of the voluntary/involuntary distinction is subject to three 
criticisms. First, following the dictates of one's conscience may, in fact, be an essen­
tially involuntary act. Second, initiation of a discharge for "hardship" may be an 
essentially voluntary act. Finally, the conduct leading to a finding of unsuitability is 
often voluntary. 
61. See AIR FORCE MANUAL, 39-12, c(ll) (July 20, 1976). 
62. The Massachusetts statute, however, makes it possible for a person to ac­
tively serve the minimum 180 days and subsequently be discharged for unsuitability 
to the service and yet remain eligible for veterans' benefits. Reynolds, however, who 
meritoriously served four and a half years before being discharged, was ineligible for 
veterans' benefits. 
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It is not argued here that l-A-O conscientious objectors and 
unsuitables discharged after active service should not receive such 
benefits. However, the purposes of granting veterans' benefits are 
compensation for disruption to one's life,63 reward for virtuous mil­
itary service,64 and stimulation of military service. 65 Granting bene­
fits to Reynolds fulfills the statute's purposes as much as granting 
benefits to l-A-O conscientious objectors and those discharged for 
unsuitability . 
The Reynolds court recognized "that there appears to be a 
serious equal protection problem"66 in the Massachusetts statute 
but found it unnecessary to decide the issue. Reynolds was simi­
larly situated with all others who were eligible to receive veterans' 
benefits. Because of an unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious 
classification scheme, however, Reynolds was denied the status of 
veteran and the accompanying benefits. Since there was no rational 
basis for the classification scheme and since there was no rational 
relation between the classification and a legitimate state goal, the 
Massachusetts statute should have been struck down as a violation 
of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection. 
V. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM 
Reynolds also argued that the Massachusetts statutory scheme 
should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny because the classifica­
tion interferes with the fundamental constitutional right to the free 
exercise of religion. 67 A similar argument was advanced in Johnson 
v. Robison68 where a conscientious objector who never served in 
the military was denied veterans' benefits. There, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the denial of benefits was, at most, 
"an incidental burden upon appellee's free exercise of religion, "69 
and that the government's substantial interest in raising and sup­
porting armies was "clearly sufficient to sustain the challenged 
legislation. "70 
63. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). 
64. Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 631, 657 (1939) (Ronan, J., concurring). 
See also Brieffor Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 17. 
65. Hutcheson v. Director of Civil Serv., 361 Mass. 480, 281 N.E.2d 53 (1972); 
Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 631, 647 (1939). 
66. 441 F. Supp. at 654. 
67. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
68. 415 U.S. 361 (1974). 
69. [d. at 385. 
70. [d. 
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The crucial distinction, however, between Robison and 
Reynolds is that Reynolds had already served four and a half years 
of active military service. He paid the price for veterans'benefits, 
both in terms of virtuous military service and disruption of his civil­
ian life.71 Robison, on the other hand, received his 1-0 exemption 
before induction and claimed veterans' benefits because he per­
formed alternate civilian service. He freely chose, prospectively, 
between active military service, with its attendant benefits, and al­
ternate civilian service without those benefits. 72 Although Robison 
holds that denying benefits to one who had not earned them did 
not interfere with the free exercise of religion, the Supreme Court 
has held that no religious test may be used as a barrier to gov­
ernmental benefits. 73 In Sherbert v. Verner,74 a Seventh-Day Ad­
ventist was discharged from her employment because of her refusal 
to work on her day of worship and was, for the same reason, un­
able to find other employment. Her subsequent application for un­
employment compensation benefits was denied on the grounds that 
she had failed without good cause to accept other suitable work. 
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's right to free exercise of 
religion was violated by the state's denial of benefits. 75 Accepting 
other employment would have infringed upon the plaintiff's deeply 
held religious beliefs. The' Court found no compelling state interest 
to uphold the denial of benefits. 76 No invidious state discriminatory 
scheme may stand in the face of the vital interest in the free exer­
cise of religion to which we are all entitled. In Reynolds, as in 
Sherbert, the plaintiff was faced with a choice of abandoning the 
religious dictates of his conscience or suffering from the denial of 
governmental benefits he justly deserved. 
The Sherbert rationale is more instructive regarding the prin­
cipal case than is Robison because the nature of the choice in 
Sherbert more closely resembles Reynolds's choice. Both plaintiffs 
were denied state government benefits that they were already enti­
tled to but for their exercising their freedom of religion. Applying 
the Sherbert analysis to Reynolds, the court would have required 
the state to justify the statutory scheme by showing a compelling 
71. See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra. 
72. 415 U.S. at 385 n.19. 
73. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). 
74. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
75. Id. at 403. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
76. 374 U.S. at 409. 
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interest. In as much as there was no state interest capable of satis­
fying the less demanding rational basis test,77 the statute would 
surely fall when subjected to closer judicial scrutiny. 78 
The sole distinction between Reynolds and Sherbert is that 
Reynolds was denied educational benefits while Sherbert was de­
nied unemployment benefits. The distinction does not appear sig­
nificant enough to make a difference. Statutory classifications 
should not place one in the position of choosing between his con­
science and his education. Since the free exercise of religion is a 
fundamental constitutional right, strict scrutiny should have been 
applied. Sherbert makes clear that incidental burdens on free exer­
cise of religion are not to be tolerated unless the state can show a 
compelling interest which justifies the burden. 79 
The Massachusetts statute barring the plaintiff from receiving 
veterans' benefits did not operate directly on the plaintiff's right to 
freely exercise his religious convictions. 8o Reynolds encountered no 
direct obstructions in the actual conduct of following his con­
77. 441 F. Supp. at 654-55 (Aldrich J., concurring). 
78. The court did not address the issue. 
79. In Sherbert, the plaintiff was ineligible for state benefits solely because she 
chose to adhere to her religious beliefs. The state ruling barring her from receiving 
unemployment benefits 
force[d] her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and 
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of 
her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental im­
position of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exer­
cise of religion as would a fine imposed against appella'Ilt for her Saturday 
worship. 
Nor may the [state] court's construction of the statute be saved from 
constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment compensation 
benefits are not appellant's "right" but merely a "privilege." It is too late in 
the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be in­
fringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege. 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (footnote omitted). See Stevens v. Ber-· 
ger, 428 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Ky. 1977); Lincoln v. True, 408 F. Supp. 22 (W.O. Ky. 
1975). 
Despite the overwhelming frequency with which the courts have faithfully 
recited the formula that the [conscientious objector] exemption is simply a 
matter of legislative grace, one should not summarily dismiss the constitu­
tional argument. With increasing vigor in recent years, the commentators 
have argued that there is more to this question than the courts have been 
willing to admit, suggesting that the Supreme Court might now speak differ­
ently on the subject should Congress attempt to withdraw its grant of grace. 
Comment, supra note 32, at 398. See Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 12-15. 
80. Governmental regulation of religious belief is clearly unconstitutional. 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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science. The statute does, however, indirectly burden the plain­
tiff's free exercise right. Because the statute denied veteran status 
to Reynolds, he did not receive the benefits necessary for the con­
tinuation of his education. Therefore, the operation of the statute 
had the effect of inhibiting in-service conscientious objectors from 
following their conscience. 
In Reynolds, the state would not be able to meet its burden of 
showing a compelling interest. There is no state interest which can 
validly be claimed as compelling. 81 The Massachusetts classification 
interferes with the plaintiff's freedom of religion and is, therefore, 
an invidious discriminatory act. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The district court decided Reynolds on the ground that there 
was a direct conflict between federal and state law. The nature of 
that conflict is unclear. A motion, now pending, has been filed for 
clarification of the judgment. Probably the court meant that when a 
state law is in conflict with a federal law the state law must fall. It 
is true that the supremacy clause makes federal law dominant over 
state law. It is also true that the pre-emption doctrine denies a 
state the right to legislate in certain areas. In Reynolds, however, 
there is no direct conflict between state and federal law. Nor is the 
legislative field of granting benefits to veterans flooded to the point 
of excluding state legislation. Each state may grant additional bene­
fits to veterans if it so desires. 
The Reynolds court reached the correct result, but did not 
support its decision on the most persuasive grounds. The court 
recognized an equal protection problem in Reynolds but did not 
decide the issue. The court should have dealt with this issue di­
rectly. The class of servicemen discharged as 1-0 conscientious ob­
jectors is similarly situated with all other veterans who are eligible 
to receive veterans' benefits. There is no rational basis upon which 
such classification can be grounded. 
Even if a rational basis could be found, there is no compelling 
state interest to satisfY a strict scrutiny test. Reynolds was a victim 
81. 441 F. Supp. at 653. See Comment, supra note 32. The state may assert an 
interest in maintaining already trained recruits adequate in number to protect our 
country. ld. at 399. But cf. Gillette Y. United States, 401 U.S. 437,462 (1971); Braun­
feld Y. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (if the interest is compelling, the court must 
determine that there is no other way the state could accomplish its purpose). 
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of an invidious state discriminatory scheme which violated his fun­
damental constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. Since 
the Massachusetts statute distinguishes between veterans solely on 
the grounds of their religious beliefs, the statute should have been 
strictly scrutinized and found to be inherently unreasonable and, 
therefore, unconstitutional. 
David B. Schultz 
